If Hitler and Roosevelt were near opposites in ideology and temperament, the Soviet dictator and the American President seemed almost polar opposites in personal style: the one hard, stolid, patient, granitic; the other dexterous, artinllate, supple, noncommitted. Both were outlanders-Roosevelt the product of a graceful Hudson River culture; Stalin, of the violent, poverty-ridden, hate-seared land of Georgia-and both had moved into the political heartland and mastered it. But while Roosevelt had risen through the loose, fragmented politics of an open society, Stalin had played a different game, slowly amassing influence in a monolithic party structure, effacing himself to avoid the ripostes of Trotsky and other Bolshevik luminaries, building alliances, jockeying for key posts, and then, after acquiring the party leadership, coldly isolating and destroying his political adversaries.

Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom

The time seemed ripe for great achievements around the peace table, and so did the company that gathered at Yalta. Victory over Germany was clearly in sight. By the end of January the Russians had invested Budapest, captured Warsaw, overrun East Prussia, and fanned out toward Stettin, Danzig, and the lower reaches of the Oder; the Allies had recovered from the Battle of the Bulge and were mobilizing for a great push astward, meanwhile maintaining heavy air attacks despite bad weather. In the Far East American troops were closing in on l\;fanila. To Yalta had come the politicians who had forged the grand coalition and the soldiers who ,vere executing the destruction of Nazi Germany. . . .

The discussions would range across the globe, remake a good part of the map, and reshape the structure of world power. But Roosevelt, for all his wide interests and darting intelligence, was focusing on three questions on the eve of Yalta: Poland, Soviet participation in the Pacific war, and the new United Nations organization. . . .

For Roosevelt the new international organization was by far the most important issue on the Yalta conference table. There was no question about an organization being established; the question was how much power it would have and how that power would be organized.

Burns, Soldier of Freedom

"However,"(Churchill) continued, "I am more interested in the question of Poland's sovereign independence and freedom than in particular frontier lines. I want the Poles to have a home in Europe and to be free to live their own lives there.... This is what is dear to the hearts of the nation of Britain. This is what we went to war against Germany for-that Poland should be free and sovereign. Everyone here knows ... that it nearly cost us our life as a nation." He went on to plead for the establishment at the conference of a new interim government of Poland pending free elections. "His Majesty's Government cordially support the President's suggestion and present the question to our Russian allies."

Burns, Soldier of Freedom

The conference also spent a lot of time on Poland's future frontiers and the composition of her government. It was decided that the frontier should follow the old Curzon Line, with some adjustment in Poland's favour. There was no serious disagreement over the need for Poland to acquire some territorial additions in the north and west, although there was disagreement over their extent.
The Soviet side proposed that Poland's western border be the Oder-Neisse line. However, the Americans and British opposed this on the dubious grounds that the Polish population would not be able to master the resources ofthe new territories, and the Yalta conference was thus unable to fix Poland's western frontier. This would be done plainly and decisively at Potsdam, thanks to the consistent position taken by the USSR.

Understandably, a sharp confrontation took place at Yalta over the composition of the Polish government, since the question concerned the political nature of a reborn Polish state in a strategically important part of Europe.

The Soviet Union took the view that a future Poland must not be governed by the people who had led her to a national catastrophe, but by the democratic forces that had fought against Hitler to free their country and restore Polish statehood. It was perfectly logical, therefore, that the USSR should recognise a provisional government in Poland that would represent the interests of the democratic forces. (On 21 April 1945 the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of friendship, mutual aid and post-war co-operation with that government.)

While not acknowledging the provisional government, the Western powers did at least see the impracticability of returning the exile government from London to Poland. Therefore at Yalta Roosevelt and Churchill proposed the dissolution ofboth the exile and the provisional governments and the formation of a new provisional government which would include the chief members of the reactionary government in exile. Both Western leaders defended this position stubbornly, aware that, though it represented for the West a rearguard action, it was an important one.

In seeking an understanding on this, the USSR was prepared to compromise: the USSR and the democratic forces of Poland agreed that the provisional government be supplemented with uncompromised politicians both from within Poland and from Polish exile circles. This became the basis ofthe resolution adopted at Yalta. The USA and Britain recognised the new government and withdrew recognition from the exile government, which then ceased to exist.

Gromyko, Memoirs