The History of the Cold war: A Comparative Perspective 
Long Telegram
1946-47
Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: ) ; ch 1c (pp.75-84) HST, vol 2; ch 7 Truman Doctrine , ch 8 Marshall Plan ; Hogan, Marshall Plan, ch Conclusion |
Zubok, A Failed Empire ; ch 3 (pp. 62-78) ; Volkogonov, Stalin, (pp.451-454) ; "The Russian Perspective: The Soviet Road to the Cold war" by Vladimir O. Pechatnov & c. Earl Edmondson, (pp.114-125)
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A. Stalin's "Election"; Speech Feb 9, 1946
B. Long Telegram ;Feb 22, 1946
C. Churchill, Fulton, Mo; March 5, 1946
D. Novikov's telegram; Sept 27, 1946
E. Truman Doctrine; Mar 12, 1947
F. Marshall Plan; June 5, 1947
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A. Stalin's Election Speech
It would be wrong to think that the Second World War broke out accidentally, or as a result of blunders committed by certain statesmen, although blunders were certainly committed. As a matter of fact, the war broke out as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of present-day monopolistic capita]iism. Marxists have more than once stated that the capitaliost system of world economy contains the elements of a general crisis and military conflicts, that, in view of that, the development of world capitalism in our times does not proceed smoothly and evenly, but through crises and catastrophic wars. The point is that the uneven development of capitalist countries usually leads, in the course of time, to a sharp disturbance of the equilibrium within the world system of capitalism, and that group of capitalist countries regards itself as being less securely provides with raw materials and markets usually attempts to change the situation and to redistribute "spheres of influence" in its own favour -- by employing armed force. As a result of this, the capitalsit world is split into two hostile camps, and war breaks out between them.
Perhaps catastrophic wars could be avoided if it were possible periodically to redistribute raw materils and markets among the respective countries in conformity with their economic weight bymeans of concerted and peaceful dcisions. But this is impossible under the present capitalist conditions of world economic development.
...
world economy, the First World War broke out; and as a result of the second crisis, the Second World War broke out.
This does not mean, of course, that the Second World War was a copy of the first. On the contrary, the Second world differed substantially in character from the first. It must be borne in mind that before attacking the Allied countries the major fascist states -- Germany, Japan and Italy -- destroyed the last remanats of bourgeois-democratic liberties at home and established there a cruel terroristic regime, trampled upon the principle of the sovereignty and free development of small countries, proclaimed as their own the policy of seizing foreign territory, and shouted from the housetops that they were aiming at world domination and the spreading of the fascist regime all over the world; and by seizing Czechoslovakia and the central regions of China, the Axis Powers showed that they were ready to carry out their threat to enslave all the freedom-loving peoples. In new of this, the Second World War against the Axis Powers, unlike the First World War, assumed from the very outset the character of an anti-fascist war, a war of liberation, one of the tasks of which was to restore democratic liberties. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the Axis Powers could only augment -- and really did augment -- the anti-fascist and liberating character of the Second World War.
It was on this basis that the anti-fascist coalition of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain and other freedom-loving countries came into being and later played the decisive role in defeating the armed forces of the Axis Powers.
That is how it stands with the question of the origin and character of the Second World War.
Everybody, perhaps, now admits that the war was not nor could have been an accident in the lives of the peoples, that it actually became a war of the peoples for their existence, and that for that very reason could not have been a swift or lightning war.
As far as our country is concerned, for her this war was the fiercest and most arduous ever fought in the history of our Motherland.
But the war was not only a curse. It was also a great school which examined and tested all the forces of the people. The war laid bare all facts and events in the rear and at the front, it ruthlessly tore down all the veils and coverings that concealed the actual features of slates, governments and parties, and brought them onto the stage without masks and without make-up, with all their defects and merits. The war was somethihg in the nature of an examination of our Soviet system, of our State, of our Government and of our Communist Party, and it summed up their work and said, as it were: Here they are, your people and organizatilons, their life and work scrutinize them carefully and treat them according to their deserts.
This is one of the positive sides of the war.
For us, for the voters, this is of immense importance, for it helps us qnickly and impartially to appraise the activities of the Party and its men, and to draw correct conclusions. At another time we would have had to study the speeches and reports of the representatives of the Party, analyze them, compare their words with their deeds, sum up the results, and so, forth. This is a complicated and laborious job, and there is no guarantee against mistakes. It is different now, when the war is over, when the war itself has verified the work of our organizations and leaders and has summed it up. It is now much easier for us to examine it, and arrive at correct conclusions.
And so, what is the summation of the war?
There is one principal summation upon which all the others rest. This summation is, that towards the end of the war the enemies sustained defeat and we and our Allies proved to be the victors. We terminated the war with complete victory over our enemies -- this is the principal summation of the war. But this summation is too general, and we cannot put a full stop here. Of course, to defeat the enemies in a war such as the Second World War, the like of which has never been witnessed in the history of mankind before, means achieving a victory of world historical importance. That is true. But still, it is a general summation, and we cannot rest content with it. To appreciate the great historical importance of our victory we must analyze the matter more concretely.
And so, how should our victory over the enemies be interpreted? What can this victory signify from the point of view of the state and the development of the internal forces of our country?
Our victory signifies, first of all, that our Soviet social system was victorious, that the Soviet social system successfully passed the test of fire in the war and proved that it is fully viable.
As we know, the foreign press on more than one occasion asserted that the Soviet social system was a "dangerous experiment" that was doomed to failure, that the Soviet system was a "house of cards" having no foundations in life and imposed upon the people by the Cheka, and that a slight shock from without was suifficient to cause this "house of cards" to collapse.
Now we can say that the war has, refuted all these assertions of the foreign press and has proved them to have been groundless. The war proved that the Soviet social system is a genuinely people's system, which grew up from the ranks of the people and enjoys their powerful| support; that the Soviet social system is fully viable and stable form of organization of society.
More than that. The issue now is not whether the Soviet social system is viable or not, because after the object lessons of the war, no sceptic now dares to express doubt concerning the viability of the Soviet social system. Now the issue is that the Soviet social system has proved to be more viable and stable than the non-Soviet social system, that the Soviet social system is a better form of organization of society than any non-Soviet social system.
Secondly, our victory signifies that our Soviet state system was victorious, that our multinational Soviet state passed all the tests of the war and proved its viability.
As we know, prominent foreign journalists have more than once expressed themselves to the effect that the Soviet multinational state is an "artificial and short-lived structure," that in the event of any complications arising the collapse of the Soviet Union would be inevitable, that the Soviet Union would share the fate of Austria-Hungary.
Now we can say that the war refuted these statements of the foreign press and proved them to have been devoid of all foundation. The war proved that the Soviet multinational state system suceessfullly passed the test, grew stronger than ever during the war, and turned out to be quite a viable state system. These gentlemen failed to realize that the analogy of Austria-Hungary was unsound, because our multinational state grew up not on the bourgeois basis, which stimulates sentiments of national distrust and national enmity, but on the Soviet basis, which, on the contrary, cultivates sentiments of friendship and fraternal cooperation among the peoples of our state.
Incidentally, after the lessons of the war, these gentlemen no longer dare to come out and deny the viability of the Soviet state system. The issue now is no longer the viability of the Soviet state system, because there can be no doubt about its viability. Now the issue is that the Soviet state system has proved to be a model multinational state, that the Soviet state system is a system of state organization in which the national problem and the problem, of the collaboration of nations have found a better solution than in any other multinational state.
Thirdly, our victory signifies that the Soviet Armed Forces, our Red Army, was victorious, that the Red Army heroically withstood all the hardships of the war, utterly routed the armies of our enemies, and emerged from the war the victor. ( A voice: "Under Comrade Stalin's leadership!" All rise. Lould and prolonged applause , rising to an ovation. )
Now, everybody, friends and enemies alike, admit that the Red Army proved equal to its tremendous task. But this was not the case six years ago, in the period before the war. As we know, prominent foreign journalists, and many recognized authorities on military affairs abroad, repeatedly stated that the condition of the Red Army roused grave doubts, that the Red Army was poorly armed and lacked a proper commanding staff, that its morale was beneath criticism, that while it might be fit for defence, it was useless for attack, and that, if struck by the German troops, the Red Army would collapse like "a colossus with feet of clay." Such statcments were made not only in Germany, but also in France, Great Britain and America.
Now we can say that the war refuted all these statements and proved them to have been groundless and ridiculous. The war proved that the Red Army is not "a colossus with feet of clay," but a first-class modern army, equipped with the most up-to-date armaments, led by most experienced commanders and possessing high morale and fighting qualities. It must not be forgotten that the Red Army is the army which utterly routed the German army, the army which only yesterday struck terror in the hearts of the armies of the European states.
It must be noted that the "critics" of the Red Army are becoming fewer and fewer. More than that. Comments are more and more frequently appearing in the foreign press noting the high qualities of the Red Army, the skill of its men and commanders, and the flawlessness of its strategy and tactics. This is understandable. After the brilliant victories the Red Army achieved at Moscow and Stalingrad, at Kursk and Belgorod, at Kiev and Kirovograd, at Minsk and Bobruisk, at Leningrad and Tallinn, at Jassy and Lvov, on the Vistula and the Niemen, on the Danube and the Oder and at Vienna and Berlin -- after all this, it is impossible not to admit that the Red Army is a first-class army, from which much can be learned. ( Loud applause. )
This is how we concretely understand the victory our country achieved over her enemies.
Such, in the main, is the summation of the war.
And so, what is the summation of the war?
...
And so, how should our victory over the enemies be interpreted? What can this victory signify from the point of view of the state and the development of the internal forces of our country?
Our victory signifies, first of all, that our Soviet social system was victorious, that the Soviet social system successfully passed the test of fire in the war and proved that it is fully viable.
As we know, the foreign press on more than one occasion asserted that the Soviet social system was a "dangerous experiment" that was doomed to failure, that the Soviet system was a "house of cards" having no foundations in life and imposed upon the people by the Cheka, and that a slight shock from without was suifficient to cause this "house of cards" to collapse.
Now we can say that the war has, refuted all these assertions of the foreign press and has proved them to have been groundless. The war proved that the Soviet social system is a genuinely people's system, which grew up from the ranks of the people and enjoys their powerful| support; that the Soviet social system is fully viable and stable form of organization of society.
More than that. The issue now is not whether the Soviet social system is viable or not, because after the object lessons of the war, no sceptic now dares to express doubt concerning the viability of the Soviet social system. Now the issue is that the Soviet social system has proved to be more viable and stable than the non-Soviet social system, that the Soviet social system is a better form of organization of society than any non-Soviet social system.
Secondly, our victory signifies that our Soviet state system was victorious, that our multinational Soviet state passed all the tests of the war and proved its viability.
As we know, prominent foreign journalists have more than once expressed themselves to the effect that the Soviet multinational state is an "artificial and short-lived structure," that in the event of any complications arising the collapse of the Soviet Union would be inevitable, that the Soviet Union would share the fate of Austria-Hungary.
Now we can say that the war refuted these statements of the foreign press and proved them to have been devoid of all foundation. The war proved that the Soviet multinational state system suceessfullly passed the test, grew stronger than ever during the war, and turned out to be quite a viable state system. These gentlemen failed to realize that the analogy of Austria-Hungary was unsound, because our multinational state grew up not on the bourgeois basis, which stimulates sentiments of national distrust and national enmity, but on the Soviet basis, which, on the contrary, cultivates sentiments of friendship and fraternal cooperation among the peoples of our state.
Incidentally, after the lessons of the war, these gentlemen no longer dare to come out and deny the viability of the Soviet state system. The issue now is no longer the viability of the Soviet state system, because there can be no doubt about its viability. Now the issue is that the Soviet state system has proved to be a model multinational state, that the Soviet state system is a system of state organization in which the national problem and the problem, of the collaboration of nations have found a better solution than in any other multinational state.
Thirdly, our victory signifies that the Soviet Armed Forces, our Red Army, was victorious, that the Red Army heroically withstood all the hardships of the war, utterly routed the armies of our enemies, and emerged from the war the victor. ( A voice: "Under Comrade Stalin's leadership!" All rise. Lould and prolonged applause , rising to an ovation. )
Now, everybody, friends and enemies alike, admit that the Red Army proved equal to its tremendous task. But this was not the case six years ago, in the period before the war. As we know, prominent foreign journalists, and many recognized authorities on military affairs abroad, repeatedly stated that the condition of the Red Army roused grave doubts, that the Red Army was poorly armed and lacked a proper commanding staff, that its morale was beneath criticism, that while it might be fit for defence, it was useless for attack, and that, if struck by the German troops, the Red Army would collapse like "a colossus with feet of clay." Such statcments were made not only in Germany, but also in France, Great Britain and America.
Now we can say that the war refuted all these statements and proved them to have been groundless and ridiculous. The war proved that the Red Army is not "a colossus with feet of clay," but a first-class modern army, equipped with the most up-to-date armaments, led by most experienced commanders and possessing high morale and fighting qualities. It must not be forgotten that the Red Army is the army which utterly routed the German army, the army which only yesterday struck terror in the hearts of the armies of the European states.
It must be noted that the "critics" of the Red Army are becoming fewer and fewer. More than that. Comments are more and more frequently appearing in the foreign press noting the high qualities of the Red Army, the skill of its men and commanders, and the flawlessness of its strategy and tactics. This is understandable. After the brilliant victories the Red Army achieved at Moscow and Stalingrad, at Kursk and Belgorod, at Kiev and Kirovograd, at Minsk and Bobruisk, at Leningrad and Tallinn, at Jassy and Lvov, on the Vistula and the Niemen, on the Danube and the Oder and at Vienna and Berlin -- after all this, it is impossible not to admit that the Red Army is a first-class army, from which much can be learned. ( Loud applause. )
This is how we concretely understand the victory our country achieved over her enemies.
Such, in the main, is the summation of the war.
It would be wrong to think that such a historical victory could have been achieved without preliminary preparation by the whole country for active defence. It would be no less wrong to assume that such preparation could have heen made in a short space of time, in a matter of three or four years. It would be still more wrong to assert that our victory was entirely due to the bravery of our troops. Without bravery it is, of course, impossible to achieve victory. But bravery alone is not enough to overpower an enemy who possesses a vast army, first-class armaments, well-trained officers and fairly well-organized supplies. To withstand the blow of such an enemy, to resist him and then to inflict utter defeat upon him it was necessary to have, in addition to the unexampled bravery of our troops, fully up-to-date armaments, and in sufficient quantities, and well-organized supplies, also in sufficient quantities. But for this it was necessary to have, and in, sufficient quantities, elementary things such as: metals -- for the production of armaments, equipment and industrial machinery; fuel -- to ensure the operation of industry and transport; cotton -- to manufacture army clothing; grain -- to supply the army with food.
Can it be said that before entering the Second World War our country already possessed the necessary minimum of the material potentialities needed to satisfy these main requirements? I think it can. To prepare for this immense task we had to carry out three five year plans of national-economic development. It was these three five-year plans that enabled us to create these material potentialities. At all events, the situation in our country in this respect was ever so much better before the Second World War, in 1940, than it was before the First World War, in 1913.
What were the material potentialities at our country's disposal before the Second World War?
To help you to understand this I will have to make you a brief report on the activities of the Communist Party in the matter of preparing our country for active defence.
If we take the data for 1940 the eve of the Second World War -- and compare it with the data for 1913 -- the eve of the First World War -- we shall get the following picture.
In 1913 there was produced in our country 4,220,000 tons of pig iron , 4,230,000 tons of steel , 29,000,000 tons of coal , 9,000,000 tons of oil , 21,600,000 tons of market grain and 740,000 tons of raw cotton.
Such were the material potentialities of our country when she entered the First World War.
This was the economic basis old Russia could utilize for the purpose of prosecuting the war.
As regards 1940, in that year the following was produced in our country: 15,000,000 tons of pig iron , i.e., nearly four times as much as in 1913; 18,300,000 tons of steel , i.e., four and a hallf times as much as in 1913; 166,000,000 tons of coal , i.e., five and a half times as much as in 1913; 31,000,000 tons of oil , i.e., three and a half times as much as in 1913; 38,300,000 tons of market grain , i.e., 17,000,000 tons more than in 1913; 2,700,000 tons of raw cotton , i.e., three and a half times as much as in 1913.
Such were the material potentialities of our country when she entered the Second World War.
This was the economic basis the Soviet Union could utilize for the purpose of prosecuting the war.
The difference, as you see, is colossal.
This umprecedented growth of production cannot be regarded as the simple and ordinary development of a country from backwardness to progress. It was a leap by which our Motherland became transformed from a backward country into an advanced country, from an agrarian into an industrial country.
This historic transformation was brought about in the course of three five-year plans, beguming with 1928 with the first year of the First Five-Year Plan. Up to that time we had to restore our ruined industries and heal the wounds inflicted upon us by the First Worid War and the Civil War. If we take into consideration the fact that the First Five-Year Plan was carried out in four years, and that the execution of the Third Five-Year Plan was interrupted by the war in the fourth year, it works out that the transformation of our country from an agrarian into an industrial country took only about thirteen years.
It cannot but be admitted that thirteen years is an incredibly short period for the execution of such a gigantic task.
It is this that explains the storm of debate that was roused in the foreign press at one time by the publication of these figures. Our friends decided that a "mirac]e" had happened; those who were ill-disposed towards us proclaimed that the five-year plans were "Bolshevik propaganda" and "tricks of the Cheka." But as miracles do not happen and the Cheka is not so powerful as to be able to annul the laws of social development, "public opinion" abroad was obliged to resign itself to the facts.
By what policy was the Communist Party able to create these material potentialities in so short a time?
First of all by the Soviet policy of industrializing the country.
The Soviet method of industrializing the country differs radically from the capitalist method of industrialization. In capitalist countries, industrialization usually starts with light industry. In view of the fact that light industry requires less investments, that capital turnover is faster, and profits are made more easily than in heavy industry, light industry becomes the first object of industrialization, in those countries. 0nly after the passage of a long period of time, during which light industry accumulates profits and concentrates them in the banks, only after this, does the turn of heavy industry come and accumulation begin gradually to be transferred to heavy industry for the purpose of creating conditions for its expansion. But this is a long process, which takes a long time, running into several decades, during which you have to wait while the light industry develops and do without heavy industry. Naturally, the Communist Party, could not take this path. The Party knew that war was approaching, that it would be impossible to defend our country without heavy industry, that it was necessary to set to work to develop heavy industry as quickly as possible, and that to be belated in this matter meant courting defeat. The Party remembered what Lenin said about it being impossible to protect the independence of our country without heavy industry, and about the likelihood of the Soviet system perishing without heavy industry. The Communist Party of our country therefore rejected the "ordinary" path of industrialization and commenced the industrialization of the country by developing heavy industry. This was a very difficult task, but one that could be accomplished. It was greatly facilitated by the nationaliization of industry and the banks, which made it possible quickly to collect funds and transfer them to heavy industry.
There can be no doubt that without this it would have been impossible to transform our country into an industrial country in so short a time.
Secondly, by the policy of collectivizing agriculture.
To put an end to our backwardness in agriculture and to provide the country with the largest possible amount of market grain, cotton, and so forth, it was necessary to pass from small peasant farminig to large-scale farming, for only large-scale farming can emloy modern machinery, utilize all the achievements of agricultural science and provide the largest possible quantity of market produce. But therev are two kinds of large-scale farming -- capitalist and collective. The Commuist Party could not take the capitalist path of developing agriculture not only on grounds of principle, but also because that path presupposes an exceedingly long process of development and requires the preliminary ruination of the peasants and their transformation into agricultural labourers. The Communist Party therefore took the path of collectivizing agriculture, the path of organizing large farms by uniting the peasant farms into collective farm's. The collective method proved to be an exceedingly progresgive method not only because it did not call for the ruination of the peasants, but also, and particularly, because it enabled us in the course of several years to cover the entire country with large collective farms capable of employing modern machinery, of utilizing all the achievements of agricultural science and of providing the country with the largest possible quantity of market produce.
There is no doubt that without the policy of collectivization we would not have been able to put an end to the age-long backwardness of our agriculture in so short a time.
It cannot be said that the Party's policy met with no resistance. Not only backward people, who always shrink from everything new, but even many prominent members of the Party persistently tried to pull our Party back, and by every possible means tried to drag it onto the "ordinary" capitalist path of development. All the anti-Party machinations of the trotskyites and of the Rights, all their "activities" in sabotaging the measures of our Government, pursued the one object of frustrating the Party's policy and of hindering industrialization and collectivization. But the Party yielded neither to the threats of some nor to the howling of others and confidently marched forward in spite of everything. It is to the Party's credit that it did not adjust itself to the backward, that it was not afraid to swim against the stream, and that all the time it held on to its position of the leading force. There can be no doubt that if the Communist Party had not displayed this staunchness and perseverance it would have been unable to uphold the policy of industrializing the country and of collectivizing agriculture.
Was the Communist Party able to make proper use of the material potentialities created in this way for the purpose of developing war production and of supplying the Red Army with the armaments it needed?
I think it was, and that it did so with the utmost success.
Leaving out of account the first year of the war, when the evacuation of industry to the East hindered the work of developing war production, we can say that during the three succeeding years of the war the Party achieved such successec as enabled it not only to supply the front with sufficient quantities of artillery, machine guns, rifles, aerophnes, tanks and ammunition, but also to accumulate reserses. Moreover, as is well known, the quality of our armaments, far from being inferior, was, in general, even superior to the German.
It is well known, that during the last three years of the war our tank industry produced annually an average of over 30,000 tanks, self propelled guns and armoured cars. ( Loud applause. )
It is well known, further, that in the same period our aircraft industry produced annually up to 40,000 aeroplanes. ( Loud applause. )
It is also well known that our artillery industry in the same period produced annually up to 120,000 guns of all calibres ( loud applause ), up to 450,000 light and heavy machine guns ( loud applause ), over 3,000,000 rifles ( applause ) and about 2,000,000 automatic rifles. ( Applause. )
Lastly, it is well known that our mortar industry in the period of 1942-44 produced annually an average of up to 100,000 mortars. ( Loud applause. )
It goes without saying that simultaneously we produced corresponding quantities of artillery shells, mines of various kinds, air bombs, and rifle and machine-gun cartridges.
It is well known, for example, that in 1944 alone we produced over 240,000,000 shells, bombs and mines ( applause ) and 7,400,000,000 cartridges. ( Loud applause. )
Such is the general picture of the way the Red Army was supplied with arms and ammunition.
As you see, it does not resemble the picture of the way our army was supplied during the First World War, when the front suffered a chronic shortage of artillery and shells, when the army fought without tanks and aircraft, and when one rifle was issued for every three men.
As regards supplying the Red Army with food and clothing, it is common knowledge that the front not only felt no shortage whatever in this respect, but even, had the necessary reserves.
This is how the matter stands as regards the activities of the Communist Party of our country in the period up to the beginning of the war and during the war.
Now a few words about the Communist Party's plans of work for the immediate future. As you know, these plans are formulated in the new five-year plan, which is to be adopted in the very near future. The main tasks of the new five-year plan are to rehabilitate the devasted regions of our country, to restore industry and agriculture to the prewar level, and then to exceed that level to a more or less considerable extent. Apart from the fact that the rationing system is to be abolished in the very near future ( loud and prolonged applause ), special attention will be devoted to the expansion of the production of consumers' goods, to raising the standard of living of the working people by steadilt reducing the prices of all commodities ( loud and prolonged applause ), and to the extensive organization of scientific research institutes of every kind ( applause ) cappable of giving the fullest scope to our scientific forces. ( Loud applause. )
I have no doubt that if we give our scientists proper assistance they will be able in the very near future not only to overtake but even outstrip the achievements of science beyond the borders of our country. ( Prolonged applause. )
As regards long-term plans, our Party intends to organize another powerful upswing of our national economy that will enable us to raise our industry to a level, say, three times as high as that of prewar industry. We must see to it that our industry shall be able to produce annually up to 50,000,000 tons of pig iron ( prolonged applause ), up to 60,000,000 tons of steel ( prolonged applause ), up to 500,000,000 tons of coal ( prolonged applause ) and up to 60,000,000 tons of oil ( prolonged applause ). Only when we succeed in doing that can we be sure that our Motherland will be insured against all contingencies. ( Loud applause. ) This will need, perhaps, another three five-year plans, if, not more. But it can be done, and we must do it. ( Loud applause. )
B. Kennen's Long Telegram, Feb 22, 1946
861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram
The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
SECRET
Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 p.m. [Received February 22--3: 52 p.m.]
511. Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 [13] involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows:
. . .
Part 5: [Practical Deductions From Standpoint of US Policy]
In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict.. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:
(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventunstic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.
(2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.
(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for the moment--highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.
(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.
For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:
(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.
(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.
(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit--Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.
(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.
(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.
KENNAN
C. Churchill, Fulton, Mo; March 5, 1946
A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organisation intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytising tendencies. I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshal Stalin. There is deep sympathy and goodwill in Britain - and I doubt not here also - towards the peoples of all the Russias and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships. We understand the Russian need to be secure on her western frontiers by the removal of all possibility of German aggression. We welcome Russia to her rightful place among the leading nations of the world. We welcome her flag upon the seas. Above all, we welcome constant, frequent and growing contacts between the Russian people and our own people on both sides of the Atlantic. It is my duty however, for I am sure you would wish me to state the facts as I see them to you, to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe.
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens alone - Greece with its immortal glories - is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French observation. The Russian-dominated Polish Government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon Germany, and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and undreamed-of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy.
D. Novikov's telegram; Sept 27, 1946
In actuality, despite all of the economic difficulties of the
postwar period connected with the enormous losses inflicted by
the war and the German fascist occupation, the Soviet Union
continues to remain economically independent of the outside 1!\',
world and is rebuilding its national economy with its own forces. t
At the same time the USSR's international position is currently
stronger than it was in the prewar period. Thanks to the
historical victories of Soviet weapons, the Soviet armed forces are
located on the territory of Germany and other formerly hostile
countries, thus guaranteeing that these countries will not be used
again for an attack on the USSR. In formerly hostile countries, such
as Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Romania, democratic
reconstruction has established regimes that have undertaken to
strengthen and maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union.
In the Slavic countries that were liberated by the Red Army or with
its assistance-Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia democratic
regimes have also been established that maintain
relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of agreements on
friendship and mutual assistance.
. . .
The ascendance to power of
President Truman, a politically unstable person but with certain
conservative tendencies, and the subsequent appointment of
Uames] Byrnes as Secretary of State meant a strengthening of the
influence on U.S. foreign policy of the most reactionary circles of
the Democratic party. The constantly increasing reactionary nature
of the foreign policy course of the United States, which
consequently approached the policy advocated by the Republican
party, laid the groundwork for close cooperation in this field
between the far right wing of the Democratic party and the
Republican party.
. . .
The establishment of American bases on islands that are often
10 000 to 12/000 kilometers from the territory of the United States
an'd are on the other side of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans clearly
indicates the offensive nature of the strategic concepts of the
commands of the U.S. army and navy. This interpretation is also
confirmed by the fact that the American navy is intensively stud~ing
the naval approaches to the boundaries of Europe: ~or thiS
purpose, American naval vessels in the course of 1946 VISited the
ports of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Turkey, and ~re~e. In
addition, the American navy is constantly operatIng In the
Mediterranean Sea.
. . .
e) Of cour~, all of these measures for maintaining a high
~lItary potential are not goals in themselves. They are only
~tendedto prepare the conditions for winning world supremacy
m a new war, the date for which, to be sure, cannot be determined
~ow by anyone, but which is contemplated by the most bellicose
CIrcles of American imperialism.
Care~uI note should be taken of the fact that the preparation
by the Umted States for a future war is being conducted with the
prosp~t o~ war ~g~ins~ the Sovi:t Union, which in the eyes of
~erIcan ImperialIsts IS the mam obstacle in the path of the
Umted Sta~es to ~o~ld domination. This is indicated by facts such
as the tactIcal traInIng of the American army for war with the
Soviet .union ~s th: future opponent, the siting of American
strategt~basesm regIOns from whichit is possible to launch strikes
on ~vlet. territory, intensified training and strengthening of
ArctIc regtons as close approaches to the USSR, and attempts to
prepare Germany and Japan to use those countries in a war
against the USSR.
Bikini Atoll tests :
Able: July 1, 1946
Baker July 25, 1946
America was conducting its foreign policy from a position of
strength. The Americans had the atomic bomb, and they knew we
didn't. For the atomic bomb to be in our enemy's hands was bad
enough. To make matters worse, the President at that time was Truman,
who had neither an ounce of statesmanship nor a flexible mind
and who was hostile and spiteful toward the Soviet Union. I can't
imagine how anyone ever considered Truman worthy of the Vice-Presidency,
much less the Presidency. The whole world knows from the newspapers
how he slapped a journalist who criticized his daughter for
being a poor singer.4 That incident alone told us something about Truman's
statesmanship, to say nothing of his suitability for so important a
post as the Presidency of the United States.
Khrushchev Remembers pp361-62
B-36 "Peacemaker"
384 built; unit cost $4.1 million =$1.574 Billion
1st flight Aug 1946
America's air force at that
time was the best in the world both in the quality and quantity of its
planes. The American "flying fortresses" and "super-fortresses" had
played a big part in winning the war against Germany and Japan, and
they were still unmatched by any other planes in the world. I would
even say that America was invincible, and the Americans flaunted this
fact by sending their planes all over Europe, violating borders and
even flying over the territory of the Soviet Union itself, not to mention
a country like Czechoslovakia. Not a single day went by when American
planes didn't violate Czechoslovak airspace. In the Soviet Union
there was considerable alarm that the US might send its troops into
Czechoslovakia and try to restore the capitalist government which had
been overthrown in 1948 by the working classes under the leadership
of the Communist Party.
Krushchev Remembers p. 362
E. Truman Doctrine: March 12, 1947
The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.
One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey.
The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.
I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek Government.
...
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.
I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.
...
We must take immediate and resolute action.
I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the $350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.
In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.
Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized.
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c. Marshall Plan: June 5, 1947
The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products - principally from America - are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character.
The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies the continuing value of which is not open to question.
